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PRIVATE ORDERING AND INTIMATE SPACES:
WHY THE ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE
IS NON-NEGOTIABLE
Michele Goodwin*
KIDNEY FOR SALE BY OWNER: HUMAN ORGANS, TRANSPLANTATION, AND
THE MARKET. By Mark J. Cherry. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univer-
sity Press. 2005. Pp. ix, 258. $26.95.
INTRODUCTION
For prospective transplant patients, options are limited under the present
organ donation model in the United States. Risk takers-patients frustrated
by government bureaucracy-now leave the United States and travel straight
to the black market in developing countries where the wait for organs is four
weeks, instead of four years. They bargain--contract, if you will-for their
organs. Nevertheless, their organs are contraband of sorts, obtained by
flouting the National Organ Transplant Act,' which proscribes the buying
and selling of body parts, as well as international protocols prohibiting
trafficking in persons and organs. Both the sellers and purchasers of these
organs participate in a delicate, if not dangerous, process. Kidneys, lungs,
livers, and other body parts are obtained from prisoners on death row in
China, from mothers in India wanting food to feed their families, from
equally desperate Brazilian and South African men hustling to survive the
cruel realities of poverty. Patients acknowledge that organ trafficking is a
cruel process within which informed consent may be more illusory than
real, but Americans line up to participate. Transplant coordinators can be
found on the internet, and because of a failing U.S. transplantation system,
most of these patients believe they have no other choice.
Yet most bioethicists seem wedded to the current federal model of "al-
truistically" obtaining organs. They argue that "organs should be understood
as gifts, not commodities" (p. 4). They refuse to endorse most if not all pro-
posals that provide incentives for organ sharing or that allow individuals to
Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. I would like to thank Richard
Epstein, Martha Ertman, June Carbone, Benjamin Hippen, John Paris, and James Taylor for engag-
ing with. me on the body parts as property question. Most specifically, Martha and Andrew inspired
alternate ways of viewing these questions beyond the traditional commodification discourse. I am
grateful to the faculty and students at Washington and Lee University, the University of Chicago
Law School, and Harvard Law School where ideas expressed in this article have been presented. I
would also like to thank Erin Crow for her outstanding research assistance. I am also very grateful
to Noah Roth and his colleagues at the Michigan Law Review.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000).
1367
Michigan Law Review
negotiate privately for organs. Most bioethicists continue to represent a
global alliance against markets and private ordering in body parts, finding
such practices "deeply morally repugnant" and fearing the demeaning of
personhood (p. 8). Their arguments-that organ procurement incentives lead
to the commodification of the human body, coercion, medical exploitation,
the demeaning of human dignity, and disregard of the sanctity of life-are
clearly persuasive and impact public policy. There is nearly global consen-
sus on prohibiting the sale of organs. But whether an absolute proscription
on organ sales makes sense is debatable in light of human suffering, high
rates of mortality on transplantation waitlists, the rise in the number of chil-
dren forced to become organ donors domestically, exploitation of people in
the third world to meet our organ demand, and the acceptance of organ
transplantation as a beneficial and preferred medical treatment for many
illnesses and diseases.
In Kidney For Sale By Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the
Market, Mark Cherry2 chronicles the bioethics movement that produced the
ban on organ sales in favor of altruistic organ procurement. Cherry's thesis,
that organ sales should be legal, radically challenges conventional wisdom
and represents a refreshing departure from traditional hegemonic transplan-
tation discourse in three nuanced ways. First, he makes a moral case against
altruism and rejects the gift of life concept, asserting that laws which reduce
organs to a "community good" controlled by the government undermine
patients' health options and "color[] much of the debate regarding the per-
missibility of an organ market" (p. 5). In this, he argues, the government
exploits rather than aids dying patients.
Second, Cherry critically assesses whether offering financial incentives
to donate organs actually coerces the poor and exploits the economically
vulnerable, rather than providing some benefit to them. Cherry challenges
the conventional wisdom that incentives necessarily violate the poor. He
critiques the validity of that entrenched position in light of inadequate evi-
dence to buttress that claim.
Third, and finally, he concludes that the consensus against selling human
organs is flawed because it inadequately addresses the distinction between
different body parts, privacy rights, and the strength of ownership rights in
bodies. In an era of increasing dissatisfaction with the inefficiency of the
United States' transplantation regime, this book issues a spirited call to re-
evaluate the wisdom of an organ procurement system that relies exclusively
on altruistic transfers.
Scholarship in this domain is long overdue, and Cherry builds a marvel-
ous case for his proposal. However, the author leaves the question of
racialized exploitation, one of the central objections to commodification,
virtually unchallenged. Indeed, the most poignant critiques against organ
selling are race-based, particularly the claim that commodification would
harm racial minorities in the United States and abroad. Most scholars ignore
the disproportionate demand for kidneys among African Americans, but in
2. Associate Professor of Philosophy, Saint Edward's University.
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making their case against commodification, they invoke horrific images
about the exploitation of African Americans and the destitute.
Thus, African Americans are a transitional good in these intense debates.
Proponents of commodification regimes in organ transplantation typically,
and artfully, avoid race landmines and in doing so unnecessarily (and per-
haps unwittingly) concede that African Americans will not fare better under
a commodification regime or that African Americans are incapable of decid-
ing whether or not to commodify for themselves. Cherry's fine attempt to
breathe new life into a rather stagnant debate offers a slight refraction to the
most crucial aspect of that debate. Before Cherry's book, African-American
patients were virtually invisible, and after the book, their concerns remain
static. Here is a critical opportunity to redefine the debate about financial
incentives in medicine and expose how commodification of organs might
work if we pay attention to the needs of African Americans and other people
of color.
In this review, I wish to push the thinking about the public/private dis-
tinction a bit further and to study both analytically and empirically the
legitimacy of organ commodification. I wish to uncloak the notion that pub-
lic regulation always benefits the disenfranchised. In particular, this review
seeks to add the concept of law and status to the public/private ordering de-
bate and to suggest that in the context of organ and tissue demand, private
ordering maximizes participation and promotes more equitable participation
among those of vulnerable status, including racial minorities and children.
By contrast, the federal prohibition on body-part selling undermines private
ordering, exacerbates organ demand, increases waiting time, penalizes the
poor, and results in thousands of unnecessary deaths per year. A market-
based system that coexists with altruistic donation introduces greater reli-
ability to the larger complex of organ procurement and distribution. Greater
reliability is likely to inspire greater confidence in the organ procurement
system.
This review moves beyond a critique of Cherry's study to incorporate a
radical new way of thinking about organ commodification as a social justice
issue. Part I provides a brief empirical overview of organ demand in the
United States, offering an alternative perspective and introducing data ill-
examined in commodification debates. Part II challenges the notion that
private ordering abandons liberal and egalitarian values in favor of individu-
alism over communitarianism. It also acknowledges the limitations of
private ordering and addresses how its more problematic features, including
the abuse of power, might be avoided. Part III argues for a hybrid system
that reorders regulation of intimate spaces. It proposes a system that allows
incentives to coincide with altruistic donation. Finally, Part IV contends that
the discussion of commodification needs to change in order to incorporate
all members of society. Only after we change the discussion from whether
or not to commodify to what degree of commodification is socially accept-
able will this incorporation happen.
April 20071 1369
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I. ORGAN COMMODIFICATION AS SOCIAL JUSTICE?:
AN EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW
Over 92,000 people in the United States wait anxiously for the elusive
phone call that an organ donor has been located.3 Scattered throughout the
United States, this odd mix of men, women, and some children comprises
all socio-economic classes, religions, and ethnicities. The gravity of the or-
gan procurement process may be best understood if we examine the actual
waiting lists, and observe the potential kidney patients' death rates. For ex-
ample, every four hours a patient waiting for a kidney dies. In 2000, 47,280
people were waiting for kidneys.4 As of August 21, 2006, the waitlist had
increased by nearly fifty percent to 67,373.' Well over one third of these
patients were African-American. 6 The median waiting period has also in-
creased substantially.7 In 1994, the wait for a kidney was 715 days,8 and by
2001-2002 (the most recent year for which data is available) it increased to
1284 days for whites and inexplicably to 1842 days-nearly two years
longer-for African Americans. 9 Near the end of the 1990s, so few kidney
transplantations had occurred as compared to need that the Organ Procure-
ment and Transplantation Network (OPTN), which coordinates and collects
data on organ transplants, found it "impossible ... to calculate an overall
median waiting time for 1996 and 1997 registrants" for its report in 1998. '0
Opponents and proponents of organ commodification agree that the statis-
tics are daunting and likely only to worsen with the increasing population of
patients diagnosed with diseases that lead to kidney failure, including severe
obesity and diabetes.
African Americans are disparately impacted by the organ shortage; they
suffer the longest waits and experience the highest death rates on transplant
3. United Network for Organ Sharing, http://www.unos.org (last visited Aug. 11, 2006).
4. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 2005 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report,
Table 1.3, available at http://optn.org/AR2005/default.htm (follow "Download 2005 Annual Report"
hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 21, 2006) [hereinafter 2005 Annual Report].
5. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Data, http://optn.org/data (last visited
Aug. 21, 2006).
6. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Organ by Ethnicity, http://www.optn.org/
latestData/step2.asp (choose category "waiting list" and count "candidates" and select "organ by
ethnicity") (last visited Aug. 21, 2006) (listing 23,368 African-American kidney transplant candi-
dates).
7. 2005 Annual Report, supra note 4, at Table 1.5.
8. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 2003 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report,
Table 1.6, available at http://optn.org/AR2005/default.htm (follow "Download 2003 Annual Report"
hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 21, 2006) [hereinafter 2003 Annual Report].
9. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Kidney Kaplan-Meier Median Waiting
Times for Registrants Listed 1997-2002, http://www.optn.org/latestData/latestData/step2.asp
(choose category "median waiting time" and choose organ "kidney" and select "waiting time by
ethnicity") (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
10. 2003 Annual Report, supra note 8, Table 1.6.
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waitlists." Yet their experiences are rarely treated as a cause for considering
radical alternatives such as commodification or using traditional civil rights
legislation like Title VI as a remedy. 2 Nor has the suffering of African-
American patients and others inspired the United Network for Organ Shar-
ing (UNOS), the private agency that organizes the United States
transplantation regime, to chart an alternative vision for organ procure-
ment. 3 To the contrary, alternate approaches to organ procurement become
stymied by liberal paternalism that generally ignores African Americans as
organ consumers and recipients, and focuses almost exclusively on the qual-
ity of their organs as donors.
For many years, commentators predicted that African Americans would
suffer most under an organ transplantation system that promotes incentives.
Not only are their assumptions based primarily on deficient data, 4 but to
11. Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity & Organ Commodification 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 305 (2004); Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Organ by Ethnicity,
http://www.optn.orglatestData/step2.asp (choose category "waiting list" and count "candidates" and
select "organ by ethnicity") (last visited Aug. 21, 2006); see also Robert S. Gaston et al., Racial
Equity in Transplantation, 270 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 1352 (1993); J. Michael Soucie et al., Race and
Sex Differences in the Identification of Candidates for Renal Transplantation, 19 AM. J. KIDNEY
DISEASE 414 (1992); Kevin McCoy, Deadly Disparity in Transplants: Blacks & Hispanics Deprived,
DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 8, 1999, at 6 (exploring "the fairness question by comparing the
population of whites, blacks, and Hispanics in New York City and eight surrounding counties with
racial breakdowns of patients who received transplants in the region from 1996 through 1998");
Brigid Schulte, Minorities Face Unequal Health in U.S.: Statistics Show Ethnicities Encounter
Higher Illness Rates, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 2, 1998, at I (reporting on research con-
ducted over several months by a team of Knight Ridder reporters, "interviewing 250 doctors,
scientists, government officials, epidemiologists, minority advocates and patients"); Nightline:
America in Black and White, (ABC television broadcast Feb. 24, 1999) (interviewing doctors, pa-
tients, and medical students about race and health, including a discussion with Dr. Clive Callender
about racism in organ transplantation referral process).
12. IOM Report On Increasing The Number Of Organ And issue Donors In The US Called
Too Cautious By Some Observers, TRANSPLANT NEWS, May 30, 2006 (noting that despite the very
persuasive claims in the IOM report about transplant disparities and deaths resulting from a shortage
in the supply of organs, incentives and alternate therapies such as stem cell exploration and devel-
opment were omitted, rejected, or simply not recognized as viable altematives)(citation omitted).
13. United Network for Organ Sharing, Financial Incentives for Organ Donation (1993),
available at http://www.unos.org/resources/bioethics.asp?index=3 (last visited Aug. 11, 2006) (sub-
committee report recommending against pursuing incentives to cure organ shortages); see Richard
Epstein, Kidney Beancounters, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2006, at A15; Charles B. Fruit, Letter to the
Editor, Organ Donors, For Love and Money, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2006, at A24; see also Ian Ayres
et al., Unequal Racial Access to Kidney Transplantation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 805 (1993); Gaston et
al., supra note 11; Soucie et al., supra note 11.
14. Over the years, most opponents to organ and tissue commodification cite Richard Tit-
muss and his iconic 1971 work The Gift Relationship to buttress their claims that incentives in body
parts and human tissues will result in unhealthy supply pools. Titmuss predicted that only unhealthy,
"skidrow" persons and "negroes" would alienate their blood and that these groups would contami-
nate the blood supply. Titmuss's predictions fell short, but were particularly persuasive during the
intense period of segregation and social racial divides. RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP
(1971); see also, ARTHUR L. CAPLAN, IF I WERE A RICH MAN COULD I BUY A PANCREAS? AND
OTHER ESSAYS ON THE ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE 158-77 (1992); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CON-
TESTED COMMODITIES (1996)(predicting that organ incentives would defile personhood and trample
moral values); Leon R. Kass, Organs for Sale? Propriety, Property, and the Price of Progress, in
POLITICS AND THE HUMAN BODY: ASSAULT ON DIGNITY 153, 171 (Jean Bethke Elshtain & J. Timo-
thy Cloyd eds., 1995) (arguing that human dignity is compromised by treating the body in market
terms); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (1987) (arguing
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date there is not any scientific evidence to support such claims. Nor have
those most opposed to organ commodification and its potentially racist im-
pact bothered to perform quantitative or qualitative research in African-
American communities to test the validity or strength of their assumptions.
Nevertheless, fears that African Americans will be reduced to scientific
chattel rightfully concern lawmakers, commentators, and bioethicists. The
challenge, it seems, is parsing out the legitimate claims about the potential
downsides of markets from the more provocative political packaging that
simply arouses racial animus and fear. On the whole, conservative com-
modification proponents as well as liberal pessimists ignore the fact that
African Americans might very well benefit from the introduction of incen-
tives into the current transplantation system because African Americans
need kidneys more than any other group.
In the movement to generate greater public consensus and support for or-
gan commodification, proponents have made two significant mistakes. First,
what they overlook in the suffering of African Americans is not simply an-
other ethnic population on the organ transplant waitlist, but a critically
important ally in the philosophical, moral, and public policy "fight" for sys-
tem alternatives. The second mistake is the manner in which commodification
becomes defined. Human suffering-an incredibly powerful metaphor-is
typically reduced to tedious arguments of efficiency, rather than social justice.
When viewed through the lens of social justice, greater access to kidneys
through incentive-based programs becomes refrained, shifting from a policy
perceived to benefit only wealthy white people to one that seems more in-
clusive and imperative for all kidney patients.
II. PRIVATE ORDERING AS COMMUNITARIAN ETHIC:
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION
Traditionally, legal scholars concerned about curing America's organ
crisis focused primarily on moral justifications for the ban on organ sales
and emphasized that any legitimate system for addressing the organ shortage
must place altruism at its operational core. By doing so, they directed atten-
tion to the question of whether or not to commodify, deflecting "attention
away from more useful inquiries into the interactions between marketization
proposals and the distribution of social power."'5 Very few new ideas de-
velop out of this limited framework, which quickly denounces any
alternatives to a free supply of organs as an immoral attack on egalitarian
values and progressive social norms. Thus, more provocative proposals to
readdress organ deficits get mired in minutiae, and the prevailing approach
is to focus primarily on superficial issues and less significant enhancements
that the "characteristic rhetoric of economic analysis is morally wrong when it is put forward as the
sole discourse of human life"); Rick Weiss, A Look At ... The Body Shop: At the Heart of an Un-
easy Commerce, WASH. POST, June 27, 1999, at B3 (observing that "[r]ather than reducing
disparities ... compensation for organs might exacerbate the differences, turning the poor into sur-
gical ward slaves or feudal donors for the rich").
15. MARTHA M. ERTMAN & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 5 (2005).
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to the current procurement methods, including whether additional public
service announcements or renaming organ procurement organizations might
inspire greater altruistic organ donation. This type of system-tweaking fails
to generate even incremental results and ultimately cannot be justified as a
more enlightened moral approach in light of thousands of deaths attributable
to poor public policy.
In this portion of the review, Section A briefly examines the seemingly
insurmountable impasse to introducing and moving alternate policy initia-
tives forward. Section B argues for a radical departure from past
commodification thinking by introducing the idea of private ordering to in-
timate spaces.
A. Autonomy Misapplied and Reconsidered
Cherry thoroughly documents the critical nature of the organ crisis in
the United States and abroad, and the circumstances that ultimately exacer-
bate transplant delays and deaths, including the rise in transplant candidates
over the past fifteen years and antigen and blood matching issues (pp. 2-3).
The statistics Cherry presents are quite daunting, but not new; Pellegrino,1
6
Caplan, 7 Fentiman, 8 and others have also picked apart this issue and
reached the same inevitable conclusion: more organs are needed. Neither the
consequences nor the prescription requires translation: without an increased
supply, thousands of Americans will die each year.
Why, then, have scholars, including Cherry, either avoided or over-
looked examining the organ procurement dilemma as a matter of social
justice? One reason is that scholars and commentators dehumanize the
transplantation process, casting the most vulnerable primarily as donors and
not potential organ recipients. A second possible explanation for this over-
sight, as discussed earlier, is that commentators perceive the theory that
African Americans will suffer under a commodification system to be a pow-
erful, unassailable argument, or at least they concede that point. One must
conclude that the debate about organ supply misapplies autonomy, treating
self-governance as a narrow utilitarian value applicable only to the exercise
of altruistic organ donation.
Autonomy-a principle of self-determination and independence-has
its place among the most fundamental ideals of liberty and the authority to
transact freely in all aspects of one's life, including negotiating and entering
into contracts by making and accepting offers and the right to be free from
the interference of others. Autonomy is the principal ingredient in the de-
bates and the ultimate judicial or legislative conclusions about creating and
16. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Families' Self-Interest and the Cadaver's Organs: What Price
Consent?, 265 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1305 (1991).
17. Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho, Allocation and Rationing: Introduction, in THE
ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE CURRENT DEBATE 247 (Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H.
Coelho, eds.) (1998).
18. Linda C. Fentiman, Organ Donation as National Service: A Proposed Federal Organ
Donation Law, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1593 (1993).
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destroying life: for example, that women possess the authority to choose
reproductive and family planning, 9 and that dying patients can refuse medi-
cal interventions.0 Judge Cardozo, for example, spoke forcefully to this
after the turn of the twentieth century, when in Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hospital," he wrote that "[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body."
22
Equally, autonomy is a valued social norm in organ transplantation, but
ironically only to the extent that individuals surrender organs without any
consideration (pp. 85-86). The very meaning of autonomy has been mis-
aligned with the issues in this debate and is now incongruent with principles
and expectations of self-determination, namely the ability to govern oneself
and the capacity of rational as well as irrational persons to make binding
decisions. Rather, autonomous decision-making has become aligned with
selflessness, sacrifice, and compassion in the transplantation realm.
By contrast, commentators portray alienation as subversive in organ
transplantation, and, therefore, as incompatible with autonomous values. Yet
this approach fails to consider that refusing to donate organs and deciding to
alienate one's organs are autonomous actions of equal legal, political, social,
and moral value. Commodification proponents will lose the public confi-
dence debate on organ incentives as long as their proposals are situated
within the traditional paradigm. For Cherry and others, the challenge must
be to reframe the traditional debate on incentives, including repositioning
and appreciating African Americans as patients and not simply as donors.
Further, incentive proponents should reject the very slippery, pervasive, but
dishonest presumptions that incentives are not in the best interest of African
Americans or that commodification leads to the exploitation of poor persons
of color rather than concede the point through an obvious failure to address
the racial component underlying the commodification debate. By failing to
recognize African Americans in the first instance as patients, commodifica-
tion proponents give unnecessary validity to the exploitation hypothesis,
23which happens to lack scientific merit and support. Scholarly reframing of
autonomy and the freedom of donors to contract away their organs would
make a significant impact on the incentives debate.
19. SeeRoev. Wade, 410U.S. 113, 152-53(1973).
20. See The Patient Self Determination Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000); Gonzales v.
Oregon, No. 04-623, slip op. (U.S. Jan 17, 2006); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11 th Cir. 2005) (opining that the
lower court properly denied parents' request for a temporary restraining order requiring the resump-
tion of nutrition and hydration for their incapacitated daughter because the parents failed to make a
substantial claim that court-ordered withdrawal violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, the
Eight Amendment or the Rehabilitation Act).
21. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1915).
22. Id. at 94.
23. See supra note 14.
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B. Rethinking Commodification and Private Ordering
Cherry argues that Western bioethics aspires to articulate a universal
medical morality, but that in doing so it reveals an insidious, invasive quality
because it attempts to impose its general consensus and expertise on the
rational individual (p. 64). He's right. My only disagreement arises with the
implication that such impositions might be permissible if individuals are
less rational, dysfunctional, or perceived as such. The liberal response is to
concede that paternalism has a positive function in the lives of those less
educated and well positioned. Traditionally, African Americans were
lumped into those categories and continued to be judged based on the social
construction of race, which carries its own political and social consequences
even while it has no biological meaning. 4 The liberal order ignores nuanced
ordering of human lives and human value where all individuals are not posi-
tioned equally, not by natural quality, but by social construct.
In the new liberal order, two significant mistakes occur. First, scholars
essentialize and infantilize African Americans, in much the way that Titmuss
cautioned that "negro" blood sellers were a menace to themselves and
25
would contaminate the blood supply with insalubrious blood. African
Americans become conditioned only as donors and not as recipients, which
ignores the affirmative benefits that a greater supply of organs could mean
to that community. Second, African Americans are reduced to irrational
beings because they might consider saving lives by selling their organs. This
temperamental ordering suggests that rationality disappears from African
Americans in the contexts of private ordering or contracting and reappears
only when African Americans give away their organs. Paternalism of this
sort belies the function of American jurisprudence. American common law
jurisprudence rejects rescue doctrine, and outside of minors and the
medically incompetent, courts avoid paternalistic interference in the lives of
individuals 6
On the other hand, Cherry does make the case that bioethical paternal-
ism has limited merit in the lives of rational, arguably white individuals
(p. 57) or what Janet Landa describes as the ethnically homogenous mid-
dleman group. 7 Yet, by conceding that those with limited social value are
incapable of independent decision-making, liberals will continue to defeat
any agendas to integrate alternatives into the broader analysis of organ
24. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY (1997); see also CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000); Derrick A.
Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893 (1995); Richard Delgado,
Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of
Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279 (2001).
25. TITMUSS, supra note 14, at 151-52.
26. See, e.g., McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Ch. Ct. 1978); Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa.
316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959) (refusing to impose liability on defendant for failure to render aid in a
drowning death).
27. Janet T. Landa, Bounded Rationality of Homo Classificus: The Law and Bioeconomics of
Social Norms as Classification, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1167 (2005) (suggesting the existence of an
economy of identity in which access to markets is controlled by appeals to homogeneity).
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transplantation. Neither should we draw lines randomly at rationality.
Should the less rational be excluded from the same privileges and protec-
tions afforded those better able to articulate their social status and navigate
political and economic institutions? Let's examine their arguments.
Public order proponents presuppose that government regulation of pri-
vate spheres promotes fairness and equity in society by maximizing the best
interest of its citizenry. Accordingly, this view of the divide between public
versus private ordering suggests that only the wealthy, sophisticated, and
skilled benefit from private contracts, or, at least, the poor and minority are
always locked in positions of significant disadvantage. While the historical
impact of discrimination is well documented, this liberal view presumes that
the state always acts in the best interest of its minority and poor citizens, and
that all citizens are equally situated with parallel bargaining power and access
to resources, including the courts, legislature, and other rule-making bodies.
But it is directly in the context of organ transplantation that such theories
fail. Public order proponents conclude that the state is always a competent
participant and that it does a better job of protecting minorities and the poor
and promoting their interests than if the government were less involved and
people negotiated on their own. The current organ crisis reveals the tragic
flaw in this otherwise compelling idea. Delays and deaths await individuals
forced to participate exclusively in the United States organ transplantation
process, which disparately impacts the lives of people of color.28
Critics of private ordering denounce its lack of consistency and its pos-
sible exploitation of vulnerable populations, but these claims seem wedded
to an essentialized perception of African Americans and a paternalistic wel-
fare model that never allows the private citizen, in this case African
Americans, to "go off" the dole. In this way, the liberal society handicaps
the vulnerable "for their own good." Moreover, public order rationales pre-
sume a lack of sophistication among vulnerable groups, in this case racial
minorities. Private ordering in the realm of body parts, so the rhetoric goes,
would promote corruption, coercion, and slavery-like dynamics. This type
of paternalism reinforces racial and class hierarchies, suggesting that private
negotiating is bad simply because racial minorities are incapable of acting in
their own interests and that spurious motivations attend all incentive consid-
erations. Private ordering in organ transplantation might inspire African
Americans to organize among themselves in churches or fraternal and soror-
ity organizations to eliminate this health disparity in their own communities.
Critics overlook that private negotiating can promote inclusion in social and
economic systems that once functioned to exclude racial minorities and
other politically disenfranchised groups.
Perhaps as a result of this potential for greater inclusion, scholars in less
racially provocative-although no less important or controversial-domains
are reconsidering the value as well as the pitfalls in commodification and
28. Barbara A. Noah, Racial Disparities in the Delivery of Health Care, 35 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 135 (1998).
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private ordering. 29 Their ability to engage in those dialogues, particularly in
the family law realm, indicates potential for broader consideration in the
organ transplantation field. On the other hand, race, as a subtext in com-
modification debates, may be so polarizing that the only spaces in which
private ordering or contract law is free from intense contestation happen to
be in the domains where whites may be significantly more or exclusively
valued (or perceived as such) as babies, embryos, mothers, and fathers. 30 The
most rapidly expanding approach to commodification happens to be in the
family law context, including women and household labor,3' adoption,3 and
assisted reproduction.33
Scholars in these areas indicate a new trend toward private ordering,
which engages market concepts in the sacred, intimate spaces of the body
and personhood itself"' Their effort contextualizes commodification and
illustrates the incomplete state of commodification theory, which fails to
account for social nuances and overstates commonalities or political, social,
and moral realities of groups.
Once scrutinized, arguments to distinguish private negotiations in family
planning and reproduction from the organ supply illuminate subtle, real dif-
ferences that actually are not so compelling as to justify our failure to
consider alternate transplant approaches. Rethinking organ commodification
29. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a Parenthood Market?: A New and
Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2003).
30. Since the adoption market is largely unregulated, the cost discrepancies in adopting
children of differing races are striking: the cost of adopting a white child may exceed $50,000 while
adopting an African-American child can be completed for as little as $4,000. See Dusty Rhodes,
Baby Trade, ILL. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2005, available at http://www.illinoistimes.comgyrobase/
Content?oid=oid%3A3990; Bonnie Miller Rubin, Adoption Bill Targets Legal Loopholes, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 27, 2005, at C1.
Additionally, newspaper advertisements show a great demand for white ova to be used in fer-
tility treatments. See Couple Seeks Eggs for $100,000, VERO BEACH PRESS J., Feb. 9, 2000, at A16
(indicating the known highest public offer seeking eggs ran in Stanford University's student news-
paper, offering $100,000 for "the eggs of a bright, young, white athlete").
31. See, e.g., Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997).
32. See, e.g., Ertman, supra note 29; Michele Goodwin, The Free Market Approach to Adop-
tion: The Value of a Baby, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 61 (2006); Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 323 (1978).
33. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J.
LEGAL MED. 35 (2000); Judith F. Daar, ART and the Search for Perfectionism: On Selecting Gender
Genes, and Gametes, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 241 (2005); Michele Goodwin, Assisted Repro-
ductive Technology & The Double Bind: The Illusory Choice of Motherhood, 9 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 1 (2005).
34. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY,
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228-30 (1995); June Carbone, What Do Women
Really Want? Feminism, Justice and the Market for Intimate Relationships, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS
Homo ECONOMICUS 405 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terrence Dougherty eds., 2005); Eric Ras-
musen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract,
73 IND L.J. 453 (1998); Barak D. Richman, Essay, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms:
Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328 (2004); Silbaugh, supra
note 31; Viviana A. Zelizer, Intimate Transactions, in THE NEW ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY: DEVELOP-
MENTS IN AN EMERGING FIELD 274 (Mauro F. Guill6n et al. eds., 2002).
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offers an opportunity for commentators to move beyond the all-or-nothing
approach to commodification, to explore which aspects of commodification
we can live with in a modem, biotechnology-rich society, and to distinguish
those from the cruder, more debasing types of private ordering.
III. PRIVATE ORDERING AND ALTRUISM RECONCEIVED
How do we shape a procurement system that embraces social justice,
promotes organ procurement, and respects individual autonomy? The an-
swers may be far less complicated than prior scholarship would lead us to
believe. The organ crisis, after all, has little to do with a shortage of organs.
Rather, federal legislation prohibits and criminalizes the use of any organ
obtained outside of altruistic procurement.3 5 The challenge, then, is repeal-
ing the National Organ Transplant Act and crafting procurement alternatives
that balance the need to avoid "bloodlessness" and the courage to move be-
yond an arranged marriage to altruism.
Several alternatives are immediately available to enhance organ pro-
curement in the United States: presumed consent, directed donations, and
commodification. Each could potentially increase organ supply. Cloning,
stem-cell therapies, and xenotransplantation also offer future alternatives for
organ enhancement or supply, but are far too premature to guarantee suc-
cess. However, these alternatives are not without controversy. The problems
as well as the benefits that attend to these models are worthy of detailed
scrutiny and consideration. But the proposal that I find the most promising
is a hybrid system that supports donor altruism but allows for a market in
cadaveric organs to thrive alongside the contemporary model.
This hybrid approach would maximize organ supply without disturbing
altruism or minimizing the value of autonomous decision-making. Those
who prefer the all-or-nothing approach to commodification might critique
this proposal as a less robust commodification plan. For others, according to
Cherry, "[o]ne possible concern is that the market will intimidate charitably
inclined persons who will thereby view themselves as precluded from giving
away organs" (p. 87). Moreover, critics of altruistic organ donation, who
rightfully illuminate its problematic, less altruistic side (compelled dona-
tions from children, coercion, pressure, and guilt from dying relatives)
might want to abandon that system altogether. These weaknesses and limita-
tions must be acknowledged in all transplantation proposals and this one in
particular. Yet, as discussed below, the proposed hybrid system embraces
greater transparency and, unlike prior commodification proposals, fully fo-
cuses on social justice. Furthermore, a more palatable incentive-based
system might provide the necessary testing ground for a later, more progres-
sive system of incentives.
Section A further develops a coordinated model of altruism and com-
modification. It also briefly discusses the secondary unique benefits
associated with introducing a market in the intimate space of organ negotia-
35. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000).
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tions. Section B argues that rather than undermine personhood, direct incen-
tives to organ sellers reorder power dynamics, giving individuals greater
control over their bodies.
A. The Model Defined
This is a simple model with one clear distinction from other commodifi-
cation proposals. In this proposed hybrid market model, harvesting would
be restricted to posthumous organ removal, thereby avoiding the murkier
and far more problematic issues involved in living incentive donations. This
model would be pareto superior were a market to be legalized. Pareto supe-
rior requires that in market transactions for limited social goods, at least one
person be made better off and that no one be made worse off. 3 6 The applica-
tion of this principle fits neatly within the proposal's goals of promoting
social justice and the efficient procurement and distribution of organs. Indi-
viduals would not be paid for living donations, but could be reimbursed for
expenses associated with living donations such as loss of income, medical
expenses, travel costs, and other financial expenditures resulting from their
donations. These would not be payments for the organ(s), but would clearly
help families recover from the economic burdens associated with donations.
This model would also permit individuals to negotiate for organ transfers
upon death. Family members, the decedent's estate, or charitable organiza-
tions could be compensated for the organs. Finally, federal oversight is an
essential component of this model. The Food and Drug Administration per-
forms a vital role in monitoring the health and safety of biological,
pharmaceutical, and medical devices introduced to the market, and I per-
ceive its role to be equally important in the domain of organ selling.
The hybrid approach is novel, but not necessarily new to market para-
digms or uncontroversial. For example, some scholars believe that pareto
superior transactions are misleading. According to them, it is impossible for
one person's position to be enhanced without somehow making the other
worse off (i.e., pareto inferiority). In this way, they would suggest that both
sellers and purchasers are "worse off' because both parties have demeaned
their personhood and degraded themselves in the process. As discussed in
Part II, altruism and markets coexist in the reproductive realms of ova dona-
tion and selling, as well as in adoption through both state-facilitated foster
care to adoption processes and private adoptions that involve lawyers, bro-
kers, and agencies. In these scenarios as well as in my proposal, altruism
competes minimally with markets. Indeed, my proposal only expands the
realm of permissible coexisting spheres of markets and altruism, which al-
ready consist of other essential, though non-biological, "goods" and
services, including food, clothing, health care, and medical insurance.
Proffered pareto inferiority claims which attempt to respond to incen-
tive-based organ procurement are overstated and potentially misleading, but
36. See Adam J. Kolber, A Matter of Priority: Transplanting Organs Preferentially to Regis-
tered Donors, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 671, 704 & n.154 (2005).
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that is not to suggest that the alienating party has not experienced a loss of
certain kind. How we describe those losses can further explain and distin-
guish whether the commodifier's potentially "worse off" status is
attributable to organ alienation or other exogenous circumstances existing in
her life, including housing, food, and other costs. In the altruism-based sys-
tem, much of the public rhetoric assumes an automatic life transformation
that unlike incentive proposals ignores the possibility of any subsequent
negative equilibriums.
Commodification exponents' most salient claims of pareto inferior con-
sequences of organ alienation might relate to other factors (though not
absolutes) in alienation of intimate spaces. In particular, the more economi-
cally destitute might suffer non-economic intangible losses such as
embarrassment, shame, and humiliation if their lives are not transformed by
organ alienation. It would be unwise to ignore this line of argument, espe-
cially because it resonates in the legal and cultural spheres. However, this
reasoning does not merit the weight or status incentive opponents would
wish that we grant it. These claims, which have resonance in civil agreement
law, are less well placed here because they are too difficult to police (and
accommodate), too difficult to afford a remedy, they involve prior estab-
lished informed consent, and most importantly they compete with far more
important values such as self-determination, autonomy, and the rule of law.
The role of the law is not to remedy every instance in which we would like
to change our minds or reward those instances in which we believe that fair
market value was lower than the worth of our goods. This well-settled con-
cept is challenged by the intimate nature of organ alienation, but no less
firmly supported by jurisprudence and custom.
Beyond increasing the supply of organs, private ordering in organ trans-
plantation will likely benefit society in several meaningful ways. First, there
would be more of an incentive to avoid buying organs on the black market
since more organs would be available in regulated transparent domestic
spheres. Black market organ shopping has the advantage of a reduced wait-
ing time, but exposes the purchaser and seller to numerous health and social
risks. Second, a more reliable system emerges with the use of incentives.
Currently, the altruistic procurement system is mired by waitlist problems,
including delays, deaths, unpredictability, and unreliability.
There are several key features of the proposed system:
(A) Regulation is important and an essential part of business operation, and
in organ markets, regulation would be important to promote and main-
tain transparency, privacy, health and safety.
(B) This hybrid model maximizes participation in the procurement process.
It allows individuals to negotiate between themselves, brokers, and in-
surance companies and maximizes one's ability to enter the market for
organs at any time.
(C) This model would also allow family members to alienate their relatives'
organs. The consent issues and lines of priority would be similar to cur-
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rent practices described in the Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.
Unless the deceased prior to death objected to organ donation and alien-
ation, her closest of kin would be permitted to altruistically donate or
alienate the organs for financial incentives.
(D) Social as well as medical histories from the supplier or her relatives
would be required as a condition to organ transacting . Social histories
reveal behaviors and other habits likely to impact the quality of organs.
Negative social history would not foreclose the party from donating. To
the contrary, as described below, an "impacted organ"-one less salu-
brious-might satisfy the needs of an individual with a similar health
condition who realizes that an optimal organ would not reverse her
most severe medical condition, such as HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, or cancer,
but might nonetheless provide a quality of life currently absent from her
life.
(E) Measures to protect the psychological health of both parties should be
incorporated in any and all human biological alienation processes. Most
importantly, we would wish to reduce the risk of harassment, litigation,
and breaches of confidentiality and abuse of privacy. Obtaining psycho-
logical as well as medical and social histories would likely provide
valuable information to assist in the selection process.
(F) Finally, organ suppliers should represent broad classes of individuals,
including those who might have suffered from certain conditions that
minimally affected his organs. Such organs may be less appealing to an
otherwise disease-free recipient, but might be far more attractive to a
patient with HIV or another condition who wishes to avoid an imminent
death. In this way, no one is shut out from the procurement process-a
process that could save a life-and disclosure of conditions is an un-
burdened exchange.
Third, incentives will likely promote better health outcomes for potential
sellers and purchasers. Those interested in alienating organs at higher mar-
ket values will have an incentive to stay healthy during their lives so that
their organs will be "picked" for transplantation. The benefits here inure not
simply to the individual, but extend also to families and sellers' communi-
ties.
Fourth, economically disadvantaged individuals have an incentive to pur-
sue better screening for illnesses both as suppliers and recipients. "According
to Jack Lynch, African Americans are diagnosed for end-stage renal failure
too late.' 38 Often, their doctors (or emergency room attendants) deliver fatal
news of their medical condition in emergency rooms. 9 Prior to this compli-
cated, life-altering time, these patients have avoided medical attention, doing
37. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 29 (1987).





what Lynch refers to as the "ostrich move" explaining that "it's out of sight
and out of mind.
' 40
In contrast, participants in the private ordering of families incorporate
medical care, psychological evaluations, and sometimes therapy into their
negotiation processes. All parties have an incentive to be as medically suit-
able and healthy as possible. Those who wish to become parents desire to
pass psychological screening processes and attain a health status suitable for
carrying a child. Likewise,. ova donors have an incentive to be healthy.
Medical screening and support has evolved into a standard benefit associ-
ated with the adoption and surrogacy processes. Similarly, in the context of
organ selling, medical screenings to determine the health and vitality of the
sellers will likely be a health benefit to participants and not simply a mo-
ment of objectification.
I have described a proposed organ-transplant incentive system that
draws upon both altruism and markets, limited only by death as a prerequi-
site for incentive-based transactions. Yet to describe only the benefits
disserves my interests as well as my attempt here to expand the dialogue
about incentives, pitfalls, and creating a sustainable system to increase the
odds of survival for patients dying from illnesses that are treated by organ
transplantation.
B. Preexisting Commodification
According to Cherry, "[a]ll systems of procurement and allocation ob-
jectify and commodify human body parts, even donation" (p. 151). Whether
for profit or not-for-profit, procurement industries "recast[] organs as a
scarce medical resource and a "product" of exchange" (p. 151). In each in-
stance, there are conditions stipulated as to which party bears the costs of
organ harvesting, processing, distribution, and transplantation. Doctors,
nurses, procurement organization specialists (paid professional solicitors),
and hospitals receive financial compensation at some point connected di-
rectly to facilitating the transplant. Thus, according to Cherry, it is improper
to criticize commercial markets as nefariously introducing market norms to
organ transplantation without also examining the altruistic procurement
process (p. 151). In short, he notes, the real debate in organ procurement is
"less about commodification [and more] about who should receive the
medical resources and who should bear the costs of appropriation and trans-
fer" (p. 151).
Indeed, the answer to who, if anyone, should profit from providing life-
saving services provides some indication that the "gift of life" concept in
organ transplantation is a seductive fiction. Often the first and last person
contributing anything altruistically is the organ donor. Commodification of
services as well as body parts already exists and will likely continue.
The commodification of body parts, as well as the patenting of human
biological resources, is well established in our health care and economic
40. Id.
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systems. 4' Recent headlines illustrate not only markets in body parts, but
also the nefarious consequences when "donor" control is minimized.42 Even
a cursory review of the headlines and recent investigative reports illuminates
a robust industry in which informed consent is rendered meaningless when
university hospitals, organ procurement organizations, funeral homes, and
other industries involved in "death trade" purloin and sell altruistically do-
nated body parts, thereby directly flouting the National Organ Transplant
Act and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, both of which ban body-part sell-
ing. Recipients and their physicians purchase these life-saving purloined
body parts from companies that trade on global stock exchanges.43 Cur-
rently, the revenue resulting from the trade in human tissues annually
exceeds one billion dollars."
IV. PRIVATE ORDERING & CITIZENSHIP
Whether individuals should be free to opt out of federal regulations in
favor of private agreements or to structure private relationships where none
currently exist are questions of significant political and legal magnitude. For
some scholars, these are moral questions that strike at the heart of how we
value and protect certain members and classes in society. Liberal scholars
traditionally reject private ordering in favor of government regulation, argu-
ing that law and economics theory maximizes efficiency, but at the risk of
more important social values, including "individualism over community.
45
Critics of private ordering rightfully cite civil rights legislation, envi-
ronmental protection laws, and policies that dismantle institutionalized
gender discrimination in employment, education, and even sports as testa-
ments to government power to promote equality and correct social wrongs.
Others who critique contract theory argue that "references to freedom and
autonomy to describe contractual terms or decisions where choice is con-
strained and freedom circumscribed" extend a false bill of goods: private
41. Michele Goodwin, Commentary, Commerce in Cadavers Is an Open Secret, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2004, at B15.
42. See, e.g., David Snyder, A Dispute Over Brain Donations; Families Allege Improper
Consent in Lawsuits Against Bethesda Institute, WASH. POST, June 30, 2005, at B 1; see also,
e.g., Former Lifequest (FL) Organ Recovery Director Arrested On Charges Of Selling Organs to His
Own Company, TRANSPLANT NEWS, April 14, 2003, at 1; Tom Mashberg, Med Examiner's Office
Has Secret Body-Parts Deal, BOSTON HERALD, May 20, 2002, at At ("The cash-strapped state
Medical Examiner's Office has a secret contract with a company that harvests body parts from do-
nors without telling their next-of-kin the remains are often used for lucrative cosmetic surgery,
documents reviewed by the Herald show.").
43. See, e.g., Biotissue Technologies, http://www.biotissue-tec.com (last visited Aug. 21,
2006); CryoLife, Inc., http://www.cryolife.com (last visited Aug. 21, 2006); Exactech, Inc., http://
www.exac.com (last visited Aug. 21, 2006); Regeneration Technologies, Inc., http://www.rtix.com
(last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
44. Renie Schapiro, Banking on the Gift of Tssue, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 2, 2005,
at GI.
45. See Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of Secu-
rities Regulation By Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 519, 521 (1999).
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ordering, they suggest, is not the panacea some of us wish it to be. 6 They
are correct that at times there are "blatant violations of liberal norms" in
contract negotiations. Sometimes there is not any negotiating at all-simply
signed contracts.
This type of Rawlsian idealism belies reality in many ways. Contract
law is about freedom, and more importantly it is about power: the power to
negotiate, bargain, consider, evaluate, and accept or decline opportunities.
Commitment to bargain and to terms of agreements reached through a nego-
tiating process is an ideal worth striving for. These are ideals which can
exist in the ordering of private intimate spaces, as demonstrated in the realm
of adoption and insemination.
Contracts and private ordering can equally be tools for social justice.
Certainly, limiting or thwarting individuals' ability to enter binding agree-
ments does nothing to reinforce their status as full citizens. Rather, it further
disadvantages the marginalized by proscribing their ability to participate in a
fundamental expression of political, social, and legal power. To suggest that
there is never any benefit even to the disadvantaged player in contract nego-
tiations ignores that even marginal benefit can be a good. To be clear, I too
agree that the legal system serves a function in discouraging and ultimately
providing a forum for remedy for oppressive terms in contracts of adhesion.
I am also fully aware that pay-day lending institutions and others of the kind
prey on the poor and minority. Yet it is important to distinguish contracting
in intimate spaces from its more problematic cousins.
Arguing that human flourishing cannot coexist with organ markets de-
flects attention not only from affirmative benefits of incentives, but also
from the varying degrees between commodification models. In other words,
unless we are absolutely opposed as a society to all incentives and markets,
we might better serve the future discourse in this domain if we distinguish
what forms of commodification are worse than others by degrees. Incentives
are, by design, meant to lure individuals into considering options that might
normally be less attractive. Incentives are tools of persuasion.
Yet it would be a mistake to lump all incentive programs together, to
conflate their usefulness, or to suggest that they are always negative tools or
that they promote negative social behaviors. Nor should acceptance of in-
centives imply that activities associated with the incentive are immoral or
unethical. For example, scholarships are incentives often used to attract the
most competitive students by providing a commitment of financial support.
Financial support viewed in this context transforms the incentive into an
insurance policy against the student's parents becoming ill, unemployed, or
somehow unable to pay tuition. Likewise, incentives to attract individuals to
participate in medical studies as well as programs to attract healthy young
men and women into military service represent different points on a spec-
trum of seemingly acceptable commodification. Yet even within those
46. Deborah Post, Beyond the Bargain Model: Status and Power in the Law of Contracts,
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE (forthcoming 2007, on file with author).
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spheres some incentives might be conceived as less conscionable or more
coercive than others.
The consequences of ignoring the possible advantages of cadaveric sales
and reimbursements for living organ donations to cure organ deficits, and
thereby enhancing the health opportunities for all Americans, especially Af-
rican Americans, are extreme. Although organ donation by African
Americans has increased in recent years, demand still dramatically exceeds
supply. High blood pressure, diabetes, hypertension, and stress, conditions
disproportionately affecting African Americans, contribute to widespread
organ failure. African-American patients will continue to experience the
longest waits on America's transplantation waitlists until more organs be-
come available for transplantation. Because they suffer the highest rate of
mortality while on the transplantation waitlists, this issue deserves urgent
address.
CONCLUSION
Cherry's scholarship contributes to the growing discourse on human
commodification and curing the organ deficit. His effort is quite impressive
and will offer much in the way of discussion for scholars and researchers
interested in examining the varying valances of commodification. What I
offer here is an analysis and proposal that moves his very timely contribu-
tion toward a more substantive engagement about commodification as a tool
for social justice.
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